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Communal unity has become virtually a political mantra in post-Speight Fiji. Even though the case being made for Fijian unity finds its popularity and legitimacy in the fear of the rank and file of the i taukei that the "Fijian Heritage" would be lost in its absence, a more dispassionate scrutiny and discussion is necessary to disentangle some of the knots that have recently clogged this issue. History reveals that the notion of a homogeneous community is more an academic construct rather than objective reality. Over the years every community has had its dissenters or splinter groups. The reasons for this have been varied. Unity has often only been possible in the face of a perceived threat to the whole group. The different sub-groups thus came together to ward off a common enemy. Focusing on the issue of the erosion, and possible disappearance of the "Fijian Heritage", it is very important to define what is meant by this crucial concept. It is equally important to identify where the perceived threat is coming from. Historically the "Indian" was seen as this unknown quantity. Political expediency has recently repeatedly proposed the 1997 Constitution as the embodiment of this threat. Unfortunately, the local Indian figures prominently in all articulations in this direction. It is assumed rather prematurely that the Indo-Fijian has always operated as one political unit while the i taukei have been fragmented. It is also assumed that Fijian unity is an indisputable precondition for national stability. Both these assumptions do not stand up to scrutiny for too long. Ascendancy to traditional Fijian office has been far from smooth in the
contemporary era. Another bastion of supposed Fijian solidarity that has hit turbulent times every now and then is the Methodist Church. The first recent splits were seen with the 1987 "coup" against Reverend Josateki Koroi. The wrangling was so bitter that thugs were subsequently hired by some senior members of the clergy to totally humiliate the unmoving, pacifist priest at his farm in Pacific Harbour. The church was again split at the chiefly village of Lomanikoro in Rewa when Reverend Maravu walked out with his flock. Later when Reverend Tuwere took over the reins of the Methodist Church in Fiji, it was seen as a compromise measure. The splits have remained. This has clearly been reflected in the ambivalent stances of the church in these crucial times. On the political front, ever since Butadroka defied Ratu Mara and formed the inevitable Fijian Nationalist Party, the voice of dissent amongst the Fijian polity has been given silent, whispering, then vociferous approval over time. After the disbanding of the Alliance party in the aftermath of 1987, Fijian political unity was always going to be a convenient fancy only. The birth of the Fijian Association Party from the convulsions of the excruciating defeat of the fateful SVT budget in 1994, spelt the first major divide in the bulk of the Fijian electorate. The SVT's power base was further eroded with the formation of the VLV. Then PANU was formed in the west as expected. Earlier attempts from there had come through Apisai Tora's ANC and Ratu Osea Gavidi's WUF. Further splits are imminent for the forthcoming general elections even though most of the Fijian leaders almost reflexively talk about Fijian unity. When these developments are seen in light of the history of internecine warfare and territorial rivalries that preceded colonization, coupled with the post-1987 emergence of heightened provincial loyalties and tribalism, the question of Fijian unity clearly acquires the proportions of a pipedream? The second assumption of Indian unity (against the Fijians) proves to be equally fallacious under scrutiny. In Fiji's first post-independence elections in 1972, the multiracial Alliance Party polled some 25% of the Indian vote. A sizeable number of Indian voters did not see the Alliance Party as an unacceptable Fijian party. In 1977, the NFP victory was so unexpected that the Indian-dominated party could not decide on a popular candidate for PM. Later in the same year, the NFP disintegrated into its infamous Dove and Flower factions and fought a bitter battle that bared all the prejudices and antipathies that have plagued the Indian community wherever it has existed. Those prejudices still persist: a Hindu/Muslim marriage has to be delicately negotiated, a North Indian/South Indian match is filled with shrill acrimony, the list goes on. In more recent times, there have been two major political parties that have appealed to the Indian voter: the National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party. It has often been said that Indians bloc voted in the 1999 elections to wrest political control over Fiji. Facts clearly show otherwise, some 30% of the Indian electorate voted NFP in 1999. Perhaps focusing on the reasons for the 70% that voted FLP would present a clearer picture. Or for that matter why did the overwhelming majority of people in Fiji vote Labour in the 1999 elections? There are 2 main reasons for this: dissatisfaction with the SVT government and its policies (especially those focusing on Privatization and Downsizing); and the FLP focus on poverty alleviation. People were more concerned about their take-home pay and personal welfare rather than the soundness of the 1997 constitution. This is not an uncommon political orientation in poverty-stricken societies. Traditionally the Indian voter has aligned himself/herself with a labour/farmer-oriented doctrine. Given his/her girmitiya origin, this is what has made better sense. The NFP was conceived under a mango tree in the burning cane fields of the West. As soon as it began to lose its "farmer/kisan" image, dissatisfaction began to creep in. The FLP has never failed to exploit this to its considerable advantage. This clearly shows a concern for personal livelihood first among the Indian electorate. If we include here the fractious religious front (Ahmmadiya, Sunni, Samaji, Sanatani, Sikh, Christian, Jain, etc.), the notion of Indian unity (like the fallacy of Fijian unity) also disappears into a puff of smoke. Should the argument forwarded here be considered acceptable, the question for
Fiji is: do we accept these communal divides as given constants and work on
turning them into strengths rather than the liabilities that they have been, or
do we continue to ignore the facts and attempt to look for convenient scapegoats
while mouthing stale platitudes that we hope will magically acquire the
proportions of sound policies? |
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People's Coalition Government - Fiji Islands |
