Chaudhry's UK mission for a democratic Fiji


Dr Warwick E Murray
Brunel University
London, UK
(formerly of the University of the South Pacific)

Fiji's deposed Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, is currently visiting the U.K. campaigning for the restoration of democracy in his divided South Pacific nation. Centrally, he is lobbying for targeted sanctions to punish what he calls the 'illegitimate regime' granted power by the military. The Fiji Military Forces intervened on May 26 in an attempt to restore order following the George Speight's 'indigenous' uprising of May 19.

The Interim government - which, but for one junior member, is entirely composed of ethnic Fijians hand picked by the forces - has now been handed the responsibility of restoring economic stability and reviewing Fiji's constitution. It expects to return the country to fresh elections in two to three year's time. Senior members of the administration have stated that the 1997 Constitution, which delivered a landslide victory for the Chaudhry-led multi-racial People's Coalition in the 1999 election, will be altered to secure the political paramountcy of indigenous Fijian interests. Mr Chaudhry, who was held hostage by Speight's group for 56 days and had his life threatened, is deeply suspicious of the interim administration's promises of democratic restoration and is calling for a re-convening of his government and 'work towards a solution from within the framework of the 1997 constitution.' Speaking at the TUC's Congress House in London last Saturday he hinted at a high level conspiracy, noting that 'some' members of the new interim cabinet and traditional Fijian chiefs appointed to guide the non-transparent constitutional reform process were Speight sympathisers. George Speight, currently incarcerated on a small island off of Suva and facing several charges of treason, is awaiting a decision by the high court on whether an immunity decree is legally binding. The decree, granted by the military in order to obtain the hostage's release, may allow Speight to escape all charges.

The May uprising is not the first coup to have taken place in the name of indigenous rights since Fijian independence in 1970. In 1987, the then Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka led two military interventions; the first displacing the elected Labour Party and the second re-acting to moves towards the establishment of a government of National Unity. The un-elected regime led the country until 1992, when the 1990 constitution - which stacked political power in the favour of indigenous Fijians - returned Rabuka to power as the leader of the SVT party. Citing the threat to indigenous rights as justification for his coups, he governed until recent elections in 1999. Ironically, Rabuka was instrumental in the development of the 1997 constitution which was widely approved of as it granted Indo-Fijians increased, though not fully equal, political representation in parliament.

In the 1999 election Rabuka's government was widely perceived to have failed in terms of delivering in its promise to secure the rights of indigenous Fijians - a factor which partly explains the split in the ethnic Fijian vote which helped deliver 58 of 71 seats to the People's Coalition. Chaudhry, as leader of the coalition's major partner the Fiji Labour Party, became Fiji's first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister in an country where since independence descendants of indentured labour (and later a South Asian immigrant commercial class) has comprised close to 50% of the population. Currently the group represents 44% of the total population of close to 850,000.

When Speight stormed parliament in May he similarly cited the threat to indigenous interests as his primary motivation. Heralded by supporters as the 'saviour of the Fijian race' he argued in particular that the Chaudhry government had intervened in insensitive ways in the issue of land. Chaudhry questions if indigenous land rights have ever really been threatened now or in the past. Under all three constitutions since 1970 (1970, 1992, 1997) the policy of the non-alienation of Fijian land (which constitutes 83% of total land) has been entrenched.

So why the uprising? Chaudhry suggests that the international media has tended to focus upon explanations that focus on the racial divide between Indians and Fijians. He sees this as a red herring which 'plays into the hands' of those really responsible. He claims that (as echoes the case in 1987) elements of an elite formerly governing class have backed nationalist forces in order to regain positions of power. Poor indigenous Fijians, in a country where poverty is rising due to past government neglect and the introduction of global free-market forces, have been easily convinced that 'Indians' - who dominate in the middle tier commercial classes (although it is often forgotten that there are many extremely poor rural Indo-Fijians) - are to blame for their misery. Furthermore, tribal politics, which have been manifested in a split in the paramount indigenous body, the Great Council of Chiefs, has also played a role in what has happened since May. Is Speight the fall guy, and Chaudhry the excuse for a stunt based on vested ethnic Fijian interests? Recent evidence suggests the losing parties in the 1999 began a grassroots destabilisation program, aimed at toppling the Chaudhry government coalition, almost the day after the electoral loss.

Whether members of the interim administration were explicitly involved is uncertain. However, what is for sure is that they will not tolerate the possibility of the restoration of the People's Coalition government. They have branded Chaudhry's international activities 'unofficial' and the lobbying of People's Coalition members in Fiji as potentially 'illegal'. Indeed, they point to Chaudhry's efforts to increase sanctions and further destabilise the decimated Fijian economy as evidence of his personal selfishness at the expense of "grassroots" Fijians of all races. Critics of Chaudhry have suggested that his autocratic and aggressive leadership style since taking over as Prime Minister just over a year ago have done as much to scare and alienate the rural Fijian landowners as any of his policies.

On the issue of whether the British government should pursue sanctions, it is a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation. Sanctions put in place so far have battered the Fijian economy in general and hurt the poorest the most. A failure to put in place any sanctions will give rise to understandable criticism given that Fiji is a 'repeat offender' in the context of a supposedly pro-democratic international community. Further, the example set by Speight's uprising, and the fact the Military have delivered virtually all of his wishes including an abrogation of the 1997 constitution and the removal President Ratu Mara, sets a worrying precedent in the South Pacific region. Copycat coups, such as the one attempted shortly after the Fiji uprising in the Solomon Islands, are a danger in an area where a disaffected and vulnerable underclass is becoming increasingly socio-economically excluded.

One option is a range of so-called "smart sanctions". These sanctions are designed to show disapproval through non-economic means and to isolate the Fijian nationalists and their supporters. Hitting at the sources of pride in Ethnic-Fijian society rather than economic elements, these sanctions focus on the parts of society Ethnic Fijians dominate-sports and the military. Preliminary sporting sanctions, such as those put up against apartheid South Africa are already in place by Australia and New Zealand-Aotearoa. Joint military operations between several countries have been postponed of cancelled. The question is: to what degree do these sanctions need to be elevated before the Fijian elite take notice and appreciate the level of international disapproval? Options include suspension from the Commonwealth (which happened after the 1987 coups), a total ban on all national sporting relations (especially Rugby), scaling back on Fijian participation in UN peacekeeping activity and recruitment of Fijian nationals by the British armed forces (a particularly high-profile source of employment, prestige and foreign income among Ethnic Fijians).

The potential pitfalls of the UK wading into a disagreement of this type are many. As the colonial power responsible for the immigration policies that brought the first Indian immigrants to Fiji, any interference from Britain is bound to bring with it criticism of continued colonial arrogance on its part. However, in a post-colonial, post-cold war world, at a time when questions of 'ethical' foreign policy loom large, can the Labour government afford to be seen to condone what has happened in Fiji?

 

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